GHSA-2vq4-854f-5c72 / CVE-2026-35595: the recursive permission CTE
cascades Admin from any owned ancestor, so a user with Write on a
shared project could reparent it under an attacker-owned root and
resolve as Admin on the moved project via the new parent.
Require Admin on both the moved project and the new parent whenever
parent_project_id is set to a non-zero value that differs from the
stored value. The gate lives in UpdateProject rather than CanUpdate
because CanUpdate is reused by permission-check-only callers
(buckets, webhooks, task ops) that pass stub &Project{ID:...} values
with ParentProjectID=0 and never commit a reparent — gating there
would spuriously trip the check for every such call.
Only non-zero ParentProjectID is gated: the generic update handler
binds a fresh struct, so an omitted parent_project_id is
indistinguishable from an explicit 0. Detach-to-root via the generic
endpoint is therefore out of scope for this fix and is tracked as a
follow-up (needs a pointer field to disambiguate).
kolaente