UpdateUser must not hand frontend_settings to xorm as a Go value. The
column is declared interface{} with `xorm:"json null"`, and xorm
mishandles both forms a caller might leave there:
- a map[string]any is passed straight to the driver, which rejects it
("unsupported type map[string]interface {}, a map") -- a 500 on every
settings save;
- a []byte (what the old code produced via json.Marshal) is base64
encoded, so the column ended up holding e.g. "bnVsbA==" (base64 of
"null"). Clients that expect an object (the Flutter app) then crash
while decoding a string.
Marshal the value to a JSON string ourselves so xorm stores it verbatim,
and only write the column for forceOverride callers -- the user-settings
endpoints, which are the only callers that set it. Other callers (OIDC
login, avatar upload, ...) leave it out entirely: listing a nil interface
in Cols makes xorm write NULL, which would wipe a user's settings on
every login.
Add migration 20260627101958 to repair rows already double-encoded by the
old code, decoding the base64 back to the original object or to NULL.
Values that do not base64-decode to a JSON null or object are left as-is,
so a legitimate string-valued setting is never rewritten.
UpdateUser was manually json.Marshal'ing user.FrontendSettings and
re-assigning the []byte back to the interface{} field before passing
the user to xorm. The column is declared:
FrontendSettings interface{} `xorm:"json null" json:"-"`
xorm's `json` modifier already marshals the field on write. Pre-marshalling
to []byte and stuffing it back into the interface causes xorm to JSON-encode
a []byte (which serializes as a base64 string). The DB ends up storing
`"bnVsbA=="` (base64 of "null") for users whose FrontendSettings is nil,
or a double-encoded blob for users with real settings.
On read, xorm unmarshals that string back into the interface as a Go
`string`, and the API response then contains:
"frontend_settings": "bnVsbA=="
instead of a JSON object or null. The Flutter mobile client
(go-vikunja/app) typed-casts `frontend_settings` to
`Map<String, dynamic>?` and crashes with:
type 'String' is not a subtype of type 'Map<String, dynamic>?'
which the app surfaces as "could not connect to this server". The web
client tolerates it silently (JS spread over a string).
Trigger path: every OIDC login of an existing user calls UpdateUser
(pkg/modules/auth/openid/openid.go), so the row is corrupted on every
re-login. See go-vikunja/app#265.
Fix: let xorm handle the JSON marshalling as the struct tag advertises.
Drop the now-unused encoding/json import.
Port GET /user/settings/totp/qrcode to v2 as an image/jpeg blob, modeled in
the OpenAPI spec. Extract the qr-to-jpeg encoding into user.GetTOTPQrCodeAsJpegForUser
so v1 and v2 share it; refactor v1 onto it. The handler reuses the existing
local-account guard, rejecting non-local users with 412.
Thread the request context through CheckUserCredentials so the
LoginFailedEvent carries IP, user agent and request id — without it,
failed logins were the one auth event useless for brute-force tracing.
All four callers have the request at hand.
LoginSucceededEvent fires from NewUserAuthTokenResponse (the chokepoint
where local, LDAP and OIDC logins converge), LoginFailedEvent from
handleFailedPassword on every failed password check, LogoutEvent from
the logout handler, and APIToken issued/revoked/used events from the
token model and auth middleware. The token events carry IDs only since
the freshly created token struct holds the raw token string and the
poison queue logs message payloads.
None of these events have a listener yet — the audit registration adds
them. Dispatching to a topic without subscribers is a no-op.
Extract the duplicated user-search business logic into two helpers both API
versions call, and refactor v1's handlers onto them:
- user.SearchUsers wraps ListUsers + email obfuscation (global search)
- models.SearchUsersForProject wraps the project read check + ListUsersFromProject
Each handler keeps its own forbidden mapping (v1 echo.ErrForbidden vs v2
huma) so v1 stays byte-identical on the wire.
Pull the business logic out of the v1 current-user account/settings handlers
into reusable functions so both v1 and the upcoming v2 handlers call one
implementation. No behavior change — the v1 handlers keep their HTTP-layer
quirks (input binding, validation, error mapping); only orchestration moves.
Homes are forced by the import graph:
- shared.GetAuthProviderName (new pkg/routes/api/shared, above openid+user so it
can combine both without a cycle; routes-only helper)
- user.ChangeUserEmail (CheckUserCredentials + UpdateEmail, both in user)
- models.ChangeUserPassword (needs models.DeleteAllUserSessions; user can't import models)
- models.UpdateUserGeneralSettings / UpdateUserAvatarProvider
(need avatar.FlushAllCaches; user can't import avatar)
The general settings get a single shared wire struct, models.UserGeneralSettings
(tagged for both swaggo/govalidator and Huma): it is the update request body and
the nested settings on GET /user for v1 (replacing v1's UserSettings) and v2.
ExtraSettingsLinks is readOnly — populated from the user on read, ignored on
write. A dedicated struct is required because user.User's settings fields are
json:"-" so they don't leak when it is embedded in other responses.
Port the BotUser resource from /api/v1's /user/bots routes to the
Huma-backed /api/v2, preserving every v1 behavior:
- Full CRUD at /user/bots and /user/bots/{bot} with v2 verbs (POST
creates, PUT updates; PATCH is synthesised by AutoPatch).
- ReadAll returns only the caller's own bots; read/update/delete of an
unowned or missing bot is refused with 403, since ownership is resolved
by loading the user (no existence disclosure, no 404 branch).
- Create requires a real user account and rejects link shares, the
bot- username prefix is enforced, and bots are created without an
email or password — all delegated to the unchanged model layer.
- ReadOne surfaces max_permission via the shared value-embed pattern and
carries an ETag for conditional requests.
doc/readOnly tags are added to the exposed user.User fields the bot
response surfaces, and to BotUser.Status, so the v2 OpenAPI schema is
documented. The model and v1 routes are untouched.
The webtest ports the v1 model-level permission matrix to the v2 HTTP
surface and adds the v2-only ETag/304 and merge-patch coverage.
Removes the `service.enablebotusers` config flag, the matching
`bot_users_enabled` field on /info, and the now-unused
`ErrBotUsersDisabled` error. Bot user routes and the frontend
settings tab are now always available.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01VhAR6xnoCdG1fpX52bzaCC
User search previously filtered bots only when they happened to match the
search string. That produced two bad behaviours:
1. Bots owned by other users could surface on an exact-username match,
leaking them into assignee pickers and similar UI.
2. A user could not reliably find their own bots by typing a partial
name, so bots became awkward to assign to tasks.
Change ListUsers to treat bot ownership explicitly: the existing match
branch excludes rows owned by someone else, and a second branch always
returns bots owned by the calling user. The own-bots branch also
respects any AdditionalCond passed in so project-scoped listings don't
start leaking bots from outside the project.
GuardLastAdmin counted only active, non-deletion-scheduled admins, but gated only on target.IsAdmin. Demoting or deleting an already-disabled or deletion-scheduled admin would then be blocked whenever exactly one active admin remained, even though removing a user who isn't in the reachable set can't reduce the count. Return early when the target isn't part of the counted set.
Verifies that HandleFailedTOTPAuth locks the account after 10 rolled-back
caller sessions (the regression from GHSA-fgfv-pv97-6cmj), and that the
persisted password reset token can unlock the account via ResetPassword.
The failed-TOTP handler shared the login request's xorm session, and the
login handler rolled that session back after a failed login. The status
change to StatusAccountLocked was silently discarded, so the account was
never locked regardless of how many failed TOTP attempts arrived.
HandleFailedTOTPAuth now opens its own session and commits independently
of the caller. The login handler rolls back its session before invoking
the handler so the lockout write can acquire a write lock on SQLite
shared-cache.
Also handles the Redis keyvalue backend returning the attempt counter as
a string instead of int64, which would have prevented the lockout path
from ever running on Redis.
See GHSA-fgfv-pv97-6cmj.
Add locked user fixture (user18, status=3) and test that both disabled
and locked users are rejected across all auth paths: API tokens,
CalDAV basic auth, CheckUserCredentials.
Ref: GHSA-94xm-jj8x-3cr4
Defense-in-depth: CheckUserCredentials now checks user status after
validating credentials. While current callers are already protected
by upstream checks, this prevents future auth bypass if new code
calls CheckUserCredentials without a subsequent status check.
Ref: GHSA-94xm-jj8x-3cr4
The username and email uniqueness checks don't need status filtering —
they just need to know if the name/email exists regardless of account
status. Use getUser (which skips the status check) instead of the
public wrappers, reducing cyclomatic complexity back under the threshold.
Make isErrUserStatusError public and replace all verbose
!IsErrAccountDisabled(err) && !IsErrAccountLocked(err) checks
with the shorter IsErrUserStatusError(err) call.
getUser now returns ErrAccountDisabled or ErrAccountLocked (alongside
the full user object) for users with StatusDisabled or StatusAccountLocked.
Callers that need disabled/locked users discard the error; all others
propagate it automatically.
GHSA-94xm-jj8x-3cr4
Separate from ErrAccountDisabled so callers can distinguish between
admin-disabled accounts (no recovery) and locked accounts (recoverable
via password reset).
Store a unix timestamp instead of a boolean, and treat entries older
than 90 seconds as expired. A background goroutine lazily cleans up
expired keys after each successful validation to prevent unbounded
growth in the keyvalue store.
Store used TOTP passcodes in the keyvalue store after successful
validation. On subsequent validation attempts, check if the passcode
was already used for the same user and reject it with
ErrTOTPPasscodeUsed. This prevents replay attacks where an intercepted
TOTP code could be reused within its 30-second validity window.
Add TestTOTPPasscodeCannotBeReused which verifies that a valid TOTP
passcode cannot be used twice within its validity window. Also add
ErrTOTPPasscodeUsed error type for the new behavior.
Add a TOTP fixture for user1 with a known secret to enable
testing TOTP validation logic. Update InitTests to load the
totp fixture alongside users and user_tokens.
The ListUsers function now references team_members and teams tables
via a subquery for external team discoverability. The pkg/user test
environment only syncs user tables, so these tests need to run in
pkg/models which has the full schema and all fixtures.
Also adds new tests for the external team discoverability bypass
directly in the models package alongside the moved tests.
Evan Baker
kolaente
Claude