Registers tasks, labels, teams, task_comments and task_assignees through
the MCP tool surface, completing the v1 resource list from the plan:
* tasks : create / read_one / update / delete (read_all omitted;
models.Task.ReadAll is a stub — TaskCollection is OOS)
* labels : full CRUD
* teams : full CRUD
* tasks_comments : full CRUD, install-time gated on
config.ServiceEnableTaskComments
* tasks_assignees : create / read_all / delete only (REST exposes no
read_one or update)
Per-resource input wrappers carry the path-param fields (task_id,
user_id) explicitly so MCP callers can provide them as JSON args.
installToolsForToken fans out to one installer per resource; the
generics-bound addTool keeps per-(resource, op) call sites at compile
time. The api_tokens.yml fixture extends token 11 to cover the new
scopes; token count stays at 5 for user 1 so existing token-listing
tests are unaffected.
Integration tests per resource cover tools/list visibility, at least
one successful create or read_all, and a permission denial scenario.
Filter MCP tool visibility and invocation by the requesting API token's
(group, permission) scopes. tools/list now returns only the tools the
token's APIPermissions authorise; tools/call additionally re-checks the
scope in the dispatcher as defence-in-depth, so a session created with
one token cannot be reused to invoke tools that token never had access to.
The per-session filter runs at session-init via the StreamableHTTPHandler
getServer factory (which the SDK calls once per session, before caching
the *mcp.Server). The dispatcher check runs on every tools/call and
returns ErrScopeDenied, which the AddTool wrapper renders as an IsError
tool result.
Wires the projects resource into the MCP server end-to-end. The five
project tools (create, read_one, read_all, update, delete) are now
visible in tools/list and dispatch through handler.Do* like the REST
layer.
- Add ProjectCreateInput / ProjectUpdateInput in inputs.go with
jsonschema tags covering only the writable fields the model honours
(title, description, identifier, hex_color, parent_project_id,
position, is_archived, is_favorite); computed fields like Owner and
MaxPermission are intentionally absent so the SDK-reflected schema
stays narrow.
- Add resources.go with a sync.Once-guarded RegisterResources(), and an
installTools helper that registers tools per (resource, op) on the
*mcp.Server via a generic addTool[In inputAdapter] helper. The
handler maps domain failures (permission denials, missing rows,
validation) to IsError tool results per the SDK convention.
- Add DispatchTyped in dispatcher.go so the AddTool handler can hand a
pre-unmarshalled wrapper to the dispatcher without a JSON
round-trip. The existing Dispatch (raw JSON path) delegates to a
shared dispatchPrepared.
- Wire RegisterResources() + installTools() into newServer() so each
new MCP session inherits the static tool set.
- Add fixture token 11 (mcp:access + projects:*) for the full-scope
integration tests; bump TestAPIToken_ReadAll's expected count.
- Refresh TestMCP_ToolsListEmpty into
TestMCP_ToolsListReturnsRegisteredResources, asserting the five
projects_* tools are present (Task 6 will introduce scope-based
filtering of this list).
- Add pkg/webtests/mcp_projects_test.go covering tools/list,
create/read_one/read_all/update/delete happy paths, schema-validation
failure on missing required title, permission denial on a forbidden
project, and nonexistent-id lookup.
Mount /api/v1/mcp (and /api/v1/mcp/*) inside the authenticated route
group. Reject JWT-authed requests with 401 (token-only policy), reject
API tokens without the mcp:access scope with 403, and propagate the
authed *user.User + *models.APIToken to r.Context() via typed keys so
downstream tool handlers can pull them out without depending on Echo.
The MCP protocol — JSON-RPC framing, Mcp-Session-Id management, SSE
streaming — is delegated to github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk
v1.6.1. tools/list returns {"tools": []} since no tools are registered
yet.
Adds the mcp scope group with a single access permission so it shows up
in GET /api/v1/routes (and therefore in the frontend token form).
Adds APIToken.HasMCPAccess() mirroring the caldav/feeds helpers.
The MCP endpoint will use POST, GET, and DELETE on the same path for the
streamable-HTTP transport, which CanDoAPIRoute's exact (method, path)
match cannot gate. The token middleware therefore skips the route check
for /api/v1/mcp and any sub-path; the actual authorization is delegated
to an inline HasMCPAccess() call in the MCP handler (added in the next
task).
Fixtures gain two MCP tokens for user 1: one mcp-only and one with
mcp:access plus projects read scopes for the per-tool scope filter tests.
GHSA-2vq4-854f-5c72 / CVE-2026-35595: the recursive permission CTE
cascades Admin from any owned ancestor, so a user with Write on a
shared project could reparent it under an attacker-owned root and
resolve as Admin on the moved project via the new parent.
Require Admin on both the moved project and the new parent whenever
parent_project_id is set to a non-zero value that differs from the
stored value. The gate lives in UpdateProject rather than CanUpdate
because CanUpdate is reused by permission-check-only callers
(buckets, webhooks, task ops) that pass stub &Project{ID:...} values
with ParentProjectID=0 and never commit a reparent — gating there
would spuriously trip the check for every such call.
Only non-zero ParentProjectID is gated: the generic update handler
binds a fresh struct, so an omitted parent_project_id is
indistinguishable from an explicit 0. Detach-to-root via the generic
endpoint is therefore out of scope for this fix and is tracked as a
follow-up (needs a pointer field to disambiguate).
Drives the login endpoint through 11 failed TOTP attempts against user10
and asserts the account ends up locked in the database, then verifies a
subsequent login with a valid TOTP code is rejected with
ErrCodeAccountLocked. Exercises the GHSA-fgfv-pv97-6cmj regression
against the real handler path.
Multiget REPORT requests would happily return tasks from projects
different from the one in the href, even though GetTasksByUIDs now
filters by access. Drop any returned task whose real project_id does
not match the project ID parsed from the href path segment.
Hardening for GHSA-48ch-p4gq-x46x.
Even with the GetTasksByUIDs authz filter in place, a user with access
to multiple projects could read a task from project B by requesting it
under project A's URL. Enforce that the task's real project_id matches
the project ID parsed from the CalDAV URL path and 404 otherwise.
Adjusts the Delete Subtask test to use the correct URL project for
uid-caldav-test-child-task-2 (which lives in project 38, not 36);
the previous URL only worked because of the authz gap being closed.
Hardening for GHSA-48ch-p4gq-x46x.
End-to-end regression test for GHSA-96q5-xm3p-7m84 / CVE-2026-35594: mints
a JWT for a link share via the real helper, then deletes the share row and
invokes the real ReadAllWeb handler to prove the full request path (not
just the unit-tested GetLinkShareFromClaims) surfaces the revocation.
Also fixes a pre-existing stale literal in the TestLinkSharing test fixture
struct: linkshareRead declared Hash="test1" while the actual fixture row
id=1 uses Hash="test". The old code never looked at the DB so the mismatch
went unnoticed; after the fix it would cause every link-share webtest that
used linkshareRead to fail hash validation.
CanDoAPIRoute's non-CRUD fallback branch compared a path-derived
permission name to the token's permission strings without checking
the request method. A token with projects.background (registered for
GET /projects/:project/background) could therefore invoke DELETE on
the same path. The same method-confusion affected the whole
/projects/:project/views/:view/buckets[/:bucket] cluster, where a
token with projects.views_buckets (registered for GET) authorized
PUT, POST, and DELETE on any accessible view's buckets.
The matcher also leaked CRUD permissions between parent and nested
sub-resource groups. When the request targeted a nested CRUD resource
(e.g. projects_teams, projects_shares, projects_users, projects_views,
projects_webhooks, projects_views_tasks, tasks_assignees, tasks_labels,
tasks_comments, tasks_relations, tasks_attachments, teams_members),
the matcher fell back from the specific group to the parent's permission
list but then looked the permission name up inside the sub-resource's
RouteDetail map. The effect was that a token holding only projects.read_all
also authorized GET on every nested projects_* list endpoint, and the
same held for create/update/delete and for the tasks.* family.
Rewrite the matcher to iterate the token's own permissions and accept
only when the stored RouteDetail's (Path, Method) matches the request.
This removes all the path-derived group guessing and makes the stored
detail the single source of truth. Preserve the tasks.read_all quirk
(one permission, two list endpoints) as an explicit two-path allowlist
inside the loop.
Extract a GetAPITokenRoutes accessor so the new property-based webtest
can consume the same snapshot served by GET /api/v1/routes.
Add TestAPITokenMethodMatching in pkg/webtests: using the live echo
router and the live apiTokenRoutes map, it iterates every advertised
permission against every registered route and asserts the matcher
accepts iff the stored (Path, Method) matches. Any future collision
introduced by a new non-CRUD route on a shared path will be caught.
After this change, previously-dead permissions like
projects.background_delete, projects.views_buckets_{put,post,delete},
other.avatar, other.ws and caldav.access start working as their UI
labels imply. Tokens that relied on the over-broad background /
views_buckets grants, or on cross-cluster CRUD bleed-through, will
lose the extra access - that is the fix.
Refs: GHSA-v479-vf79-mg83
Regression test for #2552. Deletes the background of project 35 (owned by
testuser6) and then fetches the project to confirm the title is still
'Test35 with background'.
The UpdateProject function referenced done_bucket_id and default_bucket_id
in its column update list, but these columns belong to the project_views
table, not the projects table. This caused SQL errors when archiving or
updating a project on MySQL/PostgreSQL.
Also adds a test for archiving a non-archived project.
Fixes#2459
Add web tests covering the authorize endpoint, token exchange, PKCE
verification, single-use codes, and refresh token rotation. Add unit
tests for redirect URI validation and PKCE. Add E2E test for the full
browser-based authorization code flow with login redirect.
Extract setupApiUrl helper for E2E tests to avoid duplication.
Adjust test assertions to reflect that projects inheriting archived
state from parents are now correctly filtered out of ReadAll results,
task collections, and search results across all database backends.
Add locked user fixture (user18, status=3) and test that both disabled
and locked users are rejected across all auth paths: API tokens,
CalDAV basic auth, CheckUserCredentials.
Ref: GHSA-94xm-jj8x-3cr4
Link share authenticated users could call ReadAll on link shares,
which leaked hash credentials for other shares on the same project.
This allowed permission escalation from read-only to write/admin.
Add a check at the top of ReadAll() that rejects link-share-authenticated
callers, mirroring the pattern in CanRead() and canDoLinkShare().
Update tests to expect 403 Forbidden for all link share permission levels.
Fixes GHSA-8hp8-9fhr-pfm9
checkAPITokenAndPutItInContext now returns 401 Unauthorized when the
token owner's account is disabled or locked, instead of a 500 error.
Also fixes the API token test to match the actual middleware behavior.
Add a CalDAV token fixture (kind=4) for user10 who has TOTP enabled,
and implement the previously-skipped test proving token-based auth
still works when TOTP is active.
Proves that a user with read-only access to a project can delete its
background image. The test expects a 403 Forbidden but the operation
proceeds because RemoveProjectBackground only checks CanRead.
Adds fixture entry giving user 15 read-only access to project 35
(which has a background_file_id).
Ref: GHSA-564f-wx8x-878h
Proves that a user can read a comment from an inaccessible task by
supplying an accessible task ID in the URL. Comment 18 belongs to
task 34 (owned by user 13), but testuser1 can read it via task 1.
Ref: GHSA-mr3j-p26x-72x4
Resolves issue #475 by modifying CalDAV discovery so Apple Reminders can
use /dav/projects/ as the home set without exposing that synthetic path
as a real task list, preserving the existing principal-based flow. This
is because Apple Reminders defaults back to the /dav/projects/ URL,
rather than accepting the /dav/principals/username/ URL specified in
Vikunja.
Resolves#475
- Fixes `removeStaleRelations` in CalDAV storage provider to only remove
relations of kinds explicitly declared in the incoming VTODO's
`RELATED-TO` properties
- When a VTODO has no `RELATED-TO` at all (e.g., a parent task from
Tasks.org), no relations are removed — they were auto-created as
inverses by child tasks
- When a VTODO declares specific relation kinds (e.g.,
`RELATED-TO;RELTYPE=PARENT`), only relations of that kind are checked
for staleness; other kinds (like auto-created `subtask` inverses) are
preserved
Fixes#2383
---------
Co-authored-by: kolaente <k@knt.li>
Address review feedback: assert exact result counts when ParadeDB is
active. fuzzy(1, prefix=true) broadens matches via edit distance,
returning 6 projects for "TEST10", 14 tasks for "number #17", and
12 projects for "Test1".
- Use require.NotEmpty instead of require.Greater for testifylint
- Skip exclusion assertions in web project search test when ParadeDB is
active, since fuzzy(1, prefix=true) on "Test1" also matches Test2, Test3
- Add httpCodeGetter interface to handle ValidationHTTPError in test helper
- Add test case for password too short in password reset
- Add test case for password too short in password update
- Fix existing test data to use valid 8+ char passwords
kolaente
kolaente
surfingbytes
Henry Cole
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