Extract the duplicated user-search business logic into two helpers both API
versions call, and refactor v1's handlers onto them:
- user.SearchUsers wraps ListUsers + email obfuscation (global search)
- models.SearchUsersForProject wraps the project read check + ListUsersFromProject
Each handler keeps its own forbidden mapping (v1 echo.ErrForbidden vs v2
huma) so v1 stays byte-identical on the wire.
The admin set-admin-flag, set-status and delete-user operations were
implemented twice — once in the v1 echo handlers, once in the v2 Huma handlers.
Extract the load/guard/mutate logic into models.SetUserAdminFlag,
models.SetUserStatusAsAdmin and models.DeleteUserAsAdmin so both APIs call the
same code; each handler keeps only its own request binding, validation and
response shape. v1 stays byte-identical on the wire.
Move the admin overview computation and struct into models.BuildOverview /
models.Overview, the admin create-user flow into models.CreateUserAsAdmin /
models.CreateUserBody, and the admin user response view into a new
pkg/routes/api/shared package (shared.AdminUser / shared.NewAdminUser) so both
the v1 and v2 admin routes call the same code. The v1 handlers are refactored
onto these helpers and stay byte-identical on the wire.
v1's TaskCollection.ReadAll is polymorphic: a kanban view returns
[]*Bucket, everything else []*Task. v2 splits the task list into a
flat-tasks endpoint and a separate buckets-with-tasks endpoint, so the
flat endpoint needs ReadAll to return tasks even for a kanban view.
SetForceFlatTasks toggles that; v1 leaves it unset and keeps its shape.
Pull the business logic out of the v1 current-user account/settings handlers
into reusable functions so both v1 and the upcoming v2 handlers call one
implementation. No behavior change — the v1 handlers keep their HTTP-layer
quirks (input binding, validation, error mapping); only orchestration moves.
Homes are forced by the import graph:
- shared.GetAuthProviderName (new pkg/routes/api/shared, above openid+user so it
can combine both without a cycle; routes-only helper)
- user.ChangeUserEmail (CheckUserCredentials + UpdateEmail, both in user)
- models.ChangeUserPassword (needs models.DeleteAllUserSessions; user can't import models)
- models.UpdateUserGeneralSettings / UpdateUserAvatarProvider
(need avatar.FlushAllCaches; user can't import avatar)
The general settings get a single shared wire struct, models.UserGeneralSettings
(tagged for both swaggo/govalidator and Huma): it is the update request body and
the nested settings on GET /user for v1 (replacing v1's UserSettings) and v2.
ExtraSettingsLinks is readOnly — populated from the user on read, ignored on
write. A dedicated struct is required because user.User's settings fields are
json:"-" so they don't leak when it is embedded in other responses.
Port the per-user webhook endpoints (/user/settings/webhooks) from /api/v1 to
the Huma-backed /api/v2: list, available events, create, update, delete. They
are the project-less sibling of the project webhooks (#2858) and share the
webhooks.enabled gate, checked inside the registrar.
Webhook.ReadAll is extended to serve the user-level list (scoped to the
authenticated user) so the v2 list handler can go through handler.DoReadAll like
the project list; the project branch is unchanged. Credentials are masked on
read via the model's existing maskCredentials, matching #2858.
Bot owners inherit read/update/delete permission on labels created by
bots they own, mirroring the bot-owner branch already used by API tokens
(see api_tokens_permissions.go). Without this, a label a bot creates is
permanently locked to that bot and the human owner cannot maintain it.
https://claude.ai/code/session_016x6mUPJuuQEeXpHY814iLh
The admin-toggle handler delegates to handler.DoUpdate — the same pipeline
v1's UpdateWeb wraps — instead of re-implementing the session/permission/commit
orchestration. TeamMember.Update now carries the persisted row back onto the
receiver so both v1 and v2 responses include id/created.
Port the Subscription resource from /api/v1 to the Huma-backed /api/v2:
POST /subscriptions/{entity}/{entityID} subscribes, DELETE unsubscribes.
The {entity} discriminator is bound as a string path param with an
enum:"project,task" tag; the model's CanCreate/CanDelete derive the numeric
EntityType from it and reject unknown kinds. Permissions and the
already-subscribed/forbidden checks come from the shared model via DoCreate/
DoDelete, identical to v1's generic handler. Mark the model's server-controlled
fields readOnly and add doc tags for the v2 schema.
In the v2 OpenAPI context a bare /webhooks/events reads as /api/v2/webhooks/events,
which does not exist — the events listing endpoint lives only on /api/v1. Point the
doc string at the absolute v1 path so v2 clients are not misled.
Webhook.ReadAll already cleared the secret and basic-auth from responses,
but Create and Update did not, so the v2 handler patched the gap with a
maskWebhookCredentials helper. Centralize the masking in the model via a
maskCredentials helper called after every DB write (ReadAll, Create,
Update) and drop the v2 handler helper.
The credentials are client-provided, not server-generated: the DB row
keeps them and outgoing deliveries reload + HMAC-sign from the DB copy,
so clearing the returned in-memory struct is correct write-only handling.
Webhook is a shared model, so v1's create/update responses also stop
echoing the submitted secret/auth — intended, and approved by the
maintainer.
Add doc tags to every exposed Webhook field, mark the server-controlled
ones (id, project_id, user_id, created_by, created, updated) readOnly,
and mark the secret and basic-auth credentials writeOnly. All three tags
are ignored by swaggo/XORM/govalidator, so v1 is unaffected.
translateDomainError only recognized web.HTTPErrorProcessor, so a
ValidationHTTPError from InvalidFieldError (e.g. an unknown webhook
event) leaked as a 500 instead of the 412 v1 returns. It carries the
status via GetHTTPCode() but cannot implement HTTPErrorProcessor because
the embedded web.HTTPError field shadows the method name. Add a
GetHTTPCode/GetCode branch so v2 surfaces the right status and preserves
the v1 numeric code on the body.
Add doc: tags so Huma can describe user_id and created in the /api/v2
OpenAPI spec (it can't read Go comments), mark the server-set created
field readOnly, and give it an explicit json:"created" tag so it
serializes in snake_case like the rest of the v2 surface.
LinkSharing.CanRead resolved the parent project from the share hash, but a
by-id read (GET /projects/{project}/shares/{share}) only carries the numeric
id, never the hash — so the project lookup returned ErrProjectShareDoesNotExist
and every read-one 404'd, even for the share's owner. This affected both v1 and
v2.
Resolve the project from ProjectID when it is set (the by-id read path), keeping
the hash lookup as a fallback for resolving a share purely by its public hash.
The permission semantic is unchanged — you can read a share if you can read its
parent project; only the project lookup changes. ReadOne still scopes by
id AND project_id, so a share id from another project the caller can access is
not leaked (404, no IDOR).
Flips the v2 webtest's pinned 404 cases to assert success and adds the
cross-project IDOR and non-member negatives.
Add doc:/readOnly:/writeOnly: tags to the shared LinkSharing model so the
Huma-generated /api/v2 schema documents every exposed field. password is
write-only (set on create, never returned); hash, sharing_type, id,
created, updated and shared_by are server-controlled and marked read-only.
swaggo/XORM/govalidator ignore these tags, so v1 is unaffected.
Port the BotUser resource from /api/v1's /user/bots routes to the
Huma-backed /api/v2, preserving every v1 behavior:
- Full CRUD at /user/bots and /user/bots/{bot} with v2 verbs (POST
creates, PUT updates; PATCH is synthesised by AutoPatch).
- ReadAll returns only the caller's own bots; read/update/delete of an
unowned or missing bot is refused with 403, since ownership is resolved
by loading the user (no existence disclosure, no 404 branch).
- Create requires a real user account and rejects link shares, the
bot- username prefix is enforced, and bots are created without an
email or password — all delegated to the unchanged model layer.
- ReadOne surfaces max_permission via the shared value-embed pattern and
carries an ETag for conditional requests.
doc/readOnly tags are added to the exposed user.User fields the bot
response surfaces, and to BotUser.Status, so the v2 OpenAPI schema is
documented. The model and v1 routes are untouched.
The webtest ports the v1 model-level permission matrix to the v2 HTTP
surface and adds the v2-only ETag/304 and merge-patch coverage.
Add doc:/readOnly: tags (and minLength on title) so the Huma-backed
/api/v2 surface documents and schema-validates APIToken. Tags are
inert for v1 (swaggo/XORM/govalidator ignore them).
Port the LabelTask resource (labels attached to a task) from the frozen
/api/v1 to the Huma-backed /api/v2 as nested routes under
/tasks/{projecttask}/labels:
- GET list the labels on a task (read access to the task)
- POST attach a label to a task (write access to the task + access to the label)
- DELETE detach a label from a task (write access to the task)
There is no read-one or update for a label-task relation, so no
max_permission. Adds doc tags and marks the server-set created timestamp
readOnly on the shared model. Permissions stay enforced at the model
layer via the existing Can* methods through handler.Do*.
Every Session field is server-controlled (sessions are created by login,
not CRUD), so all exposed fields get readOnly:"true". The doc tags feed
Huma's reflected /api/v2 schema; they are inert for v1.
Label writes/deletes are owner-only (CanUpdate/CanDelete), but hasAccessToLabel
derived max_permission from the accessible task's permission with a read fallback
for the creator branch — so owners showed as read-only and a task-admin reading
a label via that task showed as a label admin. Derive it from ownership instead:
owner -> admin, otherwise read. Corrects the value CanRead returns for both v1's
x-max-permission header and the new v2 max_permission body field.
Cut narration a reader can infer from the code (envelope element type,
path-param binding, per-case test descriptions). Keep the non-obvious
rationale: IDOR scoping, RFC 9110 etag quoting, why the feature gate sits
in the registrar, and the author-only fixture crux.
TaskComment.Update used tc.Author as the TaskCommentUpdatedEvent doer, but
that field is bound from the request body. A client could omit it (nil doer,
breaking the event) or spoof another user. Resolve the doer from the session
auth via GetUserOrLinkShareUser instead, mirroring Create and Delete. CanUpdate
already guarantees the authenticated user is the comment's author, so this is
both correct and consistent. Affects v1 and v2, which share the model.
Add TaskComment CRUD on /api/v2 under /tasks/{task}/comments, mirroring
the project_views nested-resource shape. The resource is feature-gated by
config.ServiceEnableTaskComments, checked inside the registrar so it runs
after config has loaded. Self-registers via init()+AddRouteRegistrar; no
routes.go change. ReadAll exposes the order_by (asc/desc) query param.
Adds doc:/readOnly: tags to the shared TaskComment model fields and a
TestHumaTaskComment webtest covering list/read/create/update/delete plus
negatives (non-author forbidden, comment under the wrong task -> 404).
kolaente
Claude