MaxBodyBytes was set to exactly the configured max file size, but a
multipart request carries extra bytes (boundary, part headers) on top of
the file, so a file at the limit could be rejected by Huma before the
handler runs. Mirror the +2 MB overhead that Echo's global BodyLimit
middleware already allows so a max-sized avatar isn't rejected.
Browsers set a real image Content-Type (image/png, image/jpeg, ...) on
the multipart avatar part, while programmatic clients often send
application/octet-stream. The part contentType tag is an allow-list for
Huma's MimeTypeValidator, which runs before the handler; broaden it so
both cases are accepted instead of being rejected with a 422.
The byte-level mimetype.DetectReader check in the handler remains the
real security gate and is unchanged.
Extend the webtest with a case that sends a part declared as image/png
and asserts it reaches the handler successfully.
Add PUT /api/v2/user/settings/avatar, the first multipart/form-data file
upload on the Huma-backed v2 API. Reuses v1's byte-level mime validation
(mimetype.DetectReader) and storage (upload.StoreAvatarFile), modeling the
request as a huma.MultipartFormFiles input so it renders as multipart/form-data
in the OpenAPI spec instead of being read off the raw echo context.
Flips the user's avatar provider to "upload" on success. Authenticated (JWT).