The OpenID callback view used a localStorage "authenticating" flag to avoid submitting the same authorization code twice when the route was remounted during an auth layout swap.
That layout swap is now guarded by AUTH_ROUTE_NAMES, so openid.auth stays in the unauthenticated shell until redirectIfSaved() navigates away. The persistent flag can instead get stranded when the page is refreshed, closed, or interrupted during the callback, making future OIDC callbacks silently return before exchanging the code.
Remove the flag so each valid callback URL is processed normally while keeping the existing state validation and TOTP retry handling.
The admin-toggle handler delegates to handler.DoUpdate — the same pipeline
v1's UpdateWeb wraps — instead of re-implementing the session/permission/commit
orchestration. TeamMember.Update now carries the persisted row back onto the
receiver so both v1 and v2 responses include id/created.
Ports the v1 DatabaseNotifications routes to the Huma /api/v2 API:
- GET /notifications lists the caller's own notifications (paginated)
- PUT /notifications/{notificationid} marks one (un-)read
- POST /notifications is a custom action marking all as read; the
link-share guard, session and commit live in the handler since there
is no CRUDable Do* for a bulk mark.
Adds fixture rows and a webtest matrix mirroring the v1 model behaviour
(own-only visibility, mark-(un)read, link-share refusal on every route).
Port the Subscription resource from /api/v1 to the Huma-backed /api/v2:
POST /subscriptions/{entity}/{entityID} subscribes, DELETE unsubscribes.
The {entity} discriminator is bound as a string path param with an
enum:"project,task" tag; the model's CanCreate/CanDelete derive the numeric
EntityType from it and reject unknown kinds. Permissions and the
already-subscribed/forbidden checks come from the shared model via DoCreate/
DoDelete, identical to v1's generic handler. Mark the model's server-controlled
fields readOnly and add doc tags for the v2 schema.
In the v2 OpenAPI context a bare /webhooks/events reads as /api/v2/webhooks/events,
which does not exist — the events listing endpoint lives only on /api/v1. Point the
doc string at the absolute v1 path so v2 clients are not misled.
Webhook.ReadAll already cleared the secret and basic-auth from responses,
but Create and Update did not, so the v2 handler patched the gap with a
maskWebhookCredentials helper. Centralize the masking in the model via a
maskCredentials helper called after every DB write (ReadAll, Create,
Update) and drop the v2 handler helper.
The credentials are client-provided, not server-generated: the DB row
keeps them and outgoing deliveries reload + HMAC-sign from the DB copy,
so clearing the returned in-memory struct is correct write-only handling.
Webhook is a shared model, so v1's create/update responses also stop
echoing the submitted secret/auth — intended, and approved by the
maintainer.
Port the v1 webhook webtest to /api/v2 and extend it to the full
permission gradient the model enforces: list needs read access while
create/update/delete need write (Project.CanWrite), exercised across an
owned project and read/write/admin shares plus a no-access project. Also
assert credential masking, events-only updates, the 412 validation path,
and that the routes 404 when webhooks.enabled is false.
Add fixture webhooks 2-5 in projects 9/10/11/2 to back the matrix; they
do not collide with the e2e tests, which scope to project 1.
Port the project-webhook routes under /projects/{project}/webhooks to
the Huma /api/v2: list, create, update (events only), delete. There is
no ReadOne — webhooks carry secrets — so no max_permission and no
AutoPatch PATCH; update is PUT only, mirroring v1.
The resource self-registers and is gated by the webhooks.enabled config
flag inside the registrar (RegisterAll runs after config loads). The
write-only secret and basic-auth credentials are cleared from
create/update responses, matching how ReadAll masks them.
Add doc tags to every exposed Webhook field, mark the server-controlled
ones (id, project_id, user_id, created_by, created, updated) readOnly,
and mark the secret and basic-auth credentials writeOnly. All three tags
are ignored by swaggo/XORM/govalidator, so v1 is unaffected.
kolaente
renovate[bot]
Weijie Zhao
Frederick [Bot]